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THE DISCOVERY PROCESS IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS: TOWARD FAIR TRIALS
AND JUST VERDICTS
EDWARD S.G. DENNIS, JR.*
Justice William J. Brennan's speech, The Criminal Prosecution: Sport-
ing Event or Quest For Truth? A Progress Report,1 featured with this
symposium addresses the changes which have occurred in criminal dis-
covery over the past twenty-six years and advocates broader discovery
for criminal defendants for the future. Impressive as Justice Brennan's
commitment to justice and work product are, his arguments do not es-
tablish that broader discovery will result in fairer trials or more just
verdicts.
Although Justice Brennan does not offer many specific proposals, he
appears to favor modifications of the Jencks and Brady rules2 to allow
discovery of the names, addresses, prior statements, and criminal records
of the government's witnesses. To make his points, Justice Brennan
compares federal criminal discovery, which for the most part is governed
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with (1) the majority opin-
ion by Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Tune,3 from which Justice Brennan, then an associate justice on
* Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division.
1. 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1990).
2. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (Brennan, J.), the Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant was entitled to federal agents' written reports relating to the events about which
the agents testified at trial. The so-called Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, clarifies and limits the
Jencks decision. It provides that such reports or statements must be provided to the defense only
after the witness has testified on direct examination. The Jencks Act is echoed in FED. R. CRIM. P.
26.2, which provides for the production of both government and defense witness statements in essen-
tially the same manner.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the government must, on
request, turn over to the defense any evidence which is favorable and material either to guilt or to
punishment. Subsequent cases have established varying tests for materiality, depending upon the
situation. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Both the Jencks and the Brady rules have generated a great deal of litigation, resulting in refine-
ments of practice which vary slightly among federal circuits.
3. In State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New
Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the basic arguments against increasing discovery rights for criminal
defendants. The arguments are still, in our view, quite compelling. According to Justice Brennan,
they may be summarized in four points:
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that court, dissented,4 (2) discovery in federal civil cases,5 (3) discovery
in state criminal cases,6 and (4) discovery in criminal cases in England.'
Justice Brennan's arguments are, in our judgment, based on flawed
assumptions. First, the assumption that reform is needed is incorrect.
Federal criminal trials are fair now, a fact not disputed directly by advo-
cates of broader discovery. Second, the assumption that prosecutors are
unlikely to search for possible exculpatory arguments based on evidence
in the government's file is incorrect.' Such arguments are often the great
weakness in the government's case, and the prosecutor searches long and
hard for them. Third, the assumption that a more perfect justice is more
likely to prevail if the two sides, defense and prosecution, are put in equal
positions is baseless. 9 Even if we could somehow equalize the disparate
privileges, advantages and resources which the two enjoy-and for many
reasons we cannot'°--there is no real reason to suppose that either the
result or the process would be fairer.
Indeed, not only is broader discovery not needed, in our view its effect
might be to diminish fairness in criminal trials. As Chief Justice Vander-
bilt argued, unscrupulous defendants faced with the loss of liberty would
use the information obtained to tailor their defenses and intimidate or
eliminate witnesses, thus increasing the chances that the jury would re-
turn an unmerited not guilty verdict." The government must contend
with the heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
that context, fairness surely does not require giving defendants time at
their leisure to shape their tactics and defenses to fit every configuration
of the government's case.
(1) Greater discovery would lead not to more accurate factfinding but to an increase in
perjured testimony by defendants or their witnesses.
(2) Greater discovery would lead to witness intimidation and reluctance on the part of
witnesses to testify.
(3) Greater discovery would place the defendant in too favorable a position.
(4) Discovery practices in other criminal justice systems are not a useful guide in deter,
mining what American federal practice should be.
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 5-7.
4. Brennan, supra note 1, at 5-7.
5. Id. at 8-10.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Cf id. at 8.
9. Cf id. at 4.
10. The disparate positions dictated by the fifth amendment alone are formidable and include
the defendant's right to remain silent with his corollary rights to call no witnesses and make no
statements either before or during the trial.
11. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
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Fairness in criminal cases is due not only the defendant but also the
general public, whose interest is represented by the government. Defend-
ants should not be protected against tripping themselves up when they
testify falsely or fabricate defenses. The "surprise" that results when the
government puts on a witness who thwarts such efforts to distort justice
is of the very essence of fairness in our system and promotes the reaching
of just verdicts. As long as human nature drives defendants to take des-
perate measures to escape criminal liability, broader discovery will only
promote and facilitate defendants' attempts to subvert justice. This is
what the majority in Tune so clearly understood in 1953, and human
nature has not changed drastically in thirty-six years.
Nevertheless, there have been some changes in criminal discovery
since Tune-and some proposed changes have been rejected. In 1975,
Congress rejected a proposal, submitted by the Supreme Court pursuant
to the Rules Enabling Act, to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The proposed amendment would have required the
prosecution, upon the defendant's pretrial motion, to provide the defense
with the names and addresses of all witnesses the United States Attorney
planned to call. 2 The proposal gave a corresponding right to the govern-
ment. The House Judiciary Committee modified the proposal by setting
the government's disclosure obligation at three days before trial.' 3 In
testimony before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, Depart-
ment of Justice representatives submitted the results of a survey of
United States Attorneys detailing over 700 instances of witness intimida-
tion, assault or assassination.' 4 Has anything happened since this presen-
tation precipitated rejection of reform in 1974 to make the fear for
witness security less pressing?
Protective orders are no answer. A request for a protective order puts
the burden on the government to come forward with evidence in support
of the request, and, even in hand, a protective order is of doubtful effec-
tiveness in many cases. Proving a violation of a protective order can be
difficult, and a defendant always can decide that violating the order is
worth the risk. If protective orders were genuinely effective, the Depart-
ment of Justice would not have had to institute its witness protection
12. See 122 CONG. REC. 25,841 (1975).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 94-247, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., at 13 (1975).
14. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1975) (statement of
John C. Keney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
1990]
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program, 5 which, as Justice Brennan acknowledges, is "a very costly
and disruptive method of protecting a witness who may be in danger." 16
As at the time of Tune, perjured defense testimony continues to
threaten the integrity of the federal criminal process. This is immedi-
ately and intuitively obvious to anyone with a criminal trial practice.1
7
Justice Brennan suggests that the Department of Justice has not proved
that perjury is suppressed by restrictive discovery.' 8 Preliminarily, it is
usually the proponents of change who bear the burden of showing that
the change would not be harmful. Yet more important, how might such
a thing ever be proved?-by asking convicted defendants after their trial
if they would have committed or suborned perjury had they known what
the government's witnesses were going to say? Clearly, neither the basic
proposition nor its converse is readily susceptible to proof.
Furthermore, there is a distinction between discovery requests that
elicit material the defendant will know only if the government tells
him-for example, the results of scientific tests or whether the defendant
was identified in a photographic array-and requests that elicit only
whether the government has a certain piece of evidence in its arsenal-
for example, the defendant's admission to his sister or the testimony of a
codefendant. Rule 1619 now compels discovery of most items fairly
within the first category; only items in the second category are really still
at issue, and it is this sort of discovery that defendants are most likely to
misuse. Because this second category of information is already within
the defendant's knowledge, its disclosure by the government certainly is
not needed to promote the truthfinding process. Rather, the only interest
served by the disclosure of this type of information is the promoting of
gamesmanship.
Justice Brennan essentially concedes Chief Justice Vanderbilt's third
point in Tune-that it is unfair to require the government to disclose
crucial aspects of its case while permitting the defendant to hide his own.
We are so accustomed to, and take so for granted, the differing obliga-
tions of the defense and the prosecution that it is easy to overlook the
15. In the witness protection program, the witness is given a new identity and relocated with his
immediate family.
16. Brennan, supra note 1, at 13.
17. However, not many perjury cases are prosecuted. The difficulty of proving the charge, a
desire to avoid the appearance of vindictiveness, and the urgent need to allocate prosecutorial re-
sources to other crimes all contribute to the government's reluctance to pursue perjury cases.
18. Brennan, supra note 1, at 12-13.
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
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significance of this point. For, while we all wish to minimize the danger
of an innocent defendant's conviction, a one-sided extension of discovery
rules may place the defendant at such an advantage that it greatly
reduces the chance of a guilty defendant's conviction, even without his
resorting to perjury or witness tampering.2" Also, the acquittal of a
guilty defendant often means that many past crimes go unpunished and
many new crimes are made possible. Studies on recidivism indicate that
career robbers may commit forty or fifty robberies per year, while career
burglars often commit well over one hundred offenses per year. 1
Finally, Chief Justice Vanderbilt's fourth argument-that the example
of other countries is no guide because of the different character of the
people and the processes2 -has not so much been disproved by Justice
Brennan as held up to ridicule. But plainly, it is unfair to compare this
one aspect of our federal criminal justice system with that of other coun-
tries. Different criminal justice systems have strikingly dissimilar ways
of arriving at the truth, and it is impossible to engraft a feature from one
system onto another without upsetting the system's balance.
The English approach to discovery which Justice Brennan so admires
is part of a complex and delicately balanced system, some aspects of
which are not nearly so favorable to the defendant. In England, as in the
United States, the search for the truth is of paramount concern, and in
that spirit broad discovery is available. But England has almost no ex-
clusionary rule for tangible evidence because the English find such a rule
to be an intolerable impediment to the conduct of a fair trial resulting in
a just verdict.23 Does Justice Brennan wish to import to the United
States all of English criminal procedure designed to result in a just ver-
dict, or only the portion dealing with discovery for the defense?
Comparisons of the federal criminal justice system with those of the
various states also are not very meaningful. First, only a small minority
of states have discovery broader in any respect that Justice Brennan
20. Most defenses-for instance, claim of right, duress or coercion, entrapment, mistaken iden-
tification, and self-defense-must be disproved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
defense knows exactly who the government's witnesses are and what they will say, but is privileged
to withhold from the government, even through the presentation of the government's case-in-chief,
the defense theory of the case and the identity of the defense witnesses, the government is obviously
placed at a great disadvantage.
21. See S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1982).
22. Tune, 13 N.J. at 219, 98 A.2d at 889.
23. Note, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: A Comparison of English and American
Law, 57 UMKC L. REV. 315 (1989).
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deems significant.24 Thus, a majority of states have a discovery policy
which, like the federal policy, is more restrictive. Second, the jurisdic-
tion of the federal criminal justice system is narrower than that of the
states and tends to have a higher proportion of cases in which witness
tampering is part of the criminal culture, such as narcotics trafficking,
political corruption and large-scale organized crime. Many of these de-
fendants have the means to find government witnesses and silence them.
Similarly, civil discovery rules and practices provide scant guidance.
Justice Brennan argues that criminal discovery should be as extensive as
civil discovery because the defendant's freedom, rather than civil liabil-
ity, is at stake." This argument has an equally persuasive flip side: One
might just as well argue that criminal discovery should be narrower be-
cause the safety and integrity of the society, rather than mere money, is
at stake. Instead of trying to draw comparisons based upon what values
are at stake, we need to look at the reality of criminal trials and the likely
effect of increased criminal discovery. The potential loss of liberty puts
pressure on criminal defendants not present in even the biggest or most
hotly contested civil suit.
Further, the argument for imposing civil discovery procedures in crim-
inal cases fails to account for the inherent differences between the two
types of proceedings. In civil cases, the burden of proof is borne almost
equally by the opposing parties because a preponderance of evidence
standard normally applies. Additionally, the broad discovery of civil
cases benefits both sides equally; civil defendants are not privileged to
withhold their theories, witness lists or deposition testimony. While Jus-
tice Brennan praises the application of civil pretrial discovery techniques
to criminal proceedings,26 he makes clear that only the defendant should
be the recipient of this kind of discovery. 27 It is no answer that the gov-
ernment's superior resources for crime investigation justify a one-sided
expansion of discovery rules. Civil suits are often conducted between
litigants who are not equal in terms of resources, but no one seriously
proposes that the better financed side should be barred from deposing
opponents or discovering their theory of the case.
It is entirely appropriate that criminal procedures, including discovery
rules, be reevaluated periodically. It would be presumptuous to assume
24. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 10.
25. Id:at 12.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 7, 10-12.
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that the current system necessarily embodies the perfect balance of rights
and responsibilities. However, we should undertake such reevaluations
with the singular goal of promoting the truth-finding process. Those re-
viewing criminal procedures should weigh evolving indicators concern-
ing the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and decide
whether these indicators suggest the need for greater defense discovery
rights or, conversely, the need to reduce nonconstitutionally based de-
fense discovery. The Department of Justice has not resisted many of the
procedures adopted during the past twenty-six years to broaden defense
discovery rights. Similarly, we hope that those who have pressed for
broader defense discovery will evaluate objectively the specifics of future
discovery proposals in the context of the truth-finding objectives of pro-
cedural rules. These objectives are disserved by reflexive support for rule
changes simply because the changes comport with some preset philoso-
phy. While a defendant's right to a fair trial certainly must be protected,
society is the loser when changes in criminal procedural rules result in
unjust acquittals.
1990]
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